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We propose a new approach to identify financial contagion. Our method accounts for possible trends in 
market linkages, and allows a description of the contagion process over the crisis period. Results for a 
sample of 25 stock markets show that the impact of the 2007-9 crisis on domestic markets from financial 
shocks originating in the US was largely heterogeneous. Markets are found to experience the crisis 
differently, regardless of whether these effects are found to be contagious. Contagion was also less 
common than could be expected based on a more commonly employed model, which assumes constant 
market interdependencies within subperiods. 
 
Keywords: Finance, Risk analysis, Stock markets; Financial contagion; Financial crises 
JEL Classification: G0; G15 
                                                     
# The authors are grateful for helpful suggestions made by anonymous Reviewers and the participants of the 47th 
Money, Macro and Finance Annual Conference at Cardiff University, September 2015; Paris Financial 
Management Conference at IPAG Business School, December 2015; 14th INFINITI Conference on International 
Finance at Trinity College Dublin, June 2016, and of the research seminars at Newcastle University Business 
School and Hull University Business School. The usual disclaimer applies that all errors and omissions are entirely 
the responsibility of the authors.  
* Corresponding author 
E-mail addresses: d.sewraj@newcastle.ac.uk (D. Serwaj), b.t.gebka@newcastle.ac.uk (B. Gebka), 




We propose an advancement to an established approach to identify financial contagion. One strand of 
the literature models contagion as an increase in otherwise constant linkages between markets, whereas 
another strand attempts to explicitly model the relationship between financial linkages and economic 
fundamentals. Both approaches are looking to identify ‘excessive’, out-of-the-ordinary spillovers as 
contagion. Our straightforward method accounts for trends in financial linkages without the need for 
explicit modelling of their dependence on changes in fundamentals, and allows for a description of how 
contagion evolves during a crisis period, thus bringing together two strands of the existing literature.  
The Global Financial Crisis in 2007 has ignited the interest of academics, practitioners, policy 
makers, and the general public in how shocks propagated in one locality spread to others, and whether 
such spillovers are excessive, in a particular period.1 Such spillovers are relevant to investors and policy 
makers in determining an appropriate reaction to shocks originating abroad. For the former, who are 
attempting to diversify risk through an international portfolio, whether spillovers are excessive and how 
those spillovers evolve will affect trading decisions. For the latter, spillovers which are purely resulting 
from fundamental linkages will require a different policy reaction to spillovers which are excessive due 
to contagion. For both the investor and the policy maker, therefore, it is important to establish whether 
contagion occurs and to understand the process by which it will evolve. 
Despite numerous academic studies examining excessive spillovers, commonly referred to as 
contagion, two core issues remain ambiguous and unresolved. Firstly, there is no commonly accepted 
definition of what constitutes contagion (and hence is excessive); for instance, the World Bank (2016) 
offers three different explanations, Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) identify no fewer than five definitions 
of contagion proposed in the literature, and Forbes (2012) lists eleven studies, each with its distinctive 
definition of contagion. Secondly, and related, there exist multiple distinct empirical methods proposed 
to test for the existence of contagion, including conditional probabilities (e.g., Eichengreen et al., 1996, 
Hartmann et al., 2004), correlation analysis (e.g., Forbes and Rigobon, 2002, Brière et al., 2012, Støve 
                                                     
1 See, for example, Gorton and Metrick (2012) for a description of that event and a list of recommended readings. 
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et al., 2014), VAR-based approaches (e.g., Climent and Meneu, 2003, Rigobon, 2003, Gebka and 
Serwa, 2006, Blatt et al., 2015, Samarakoon, 2017), multivariate GARCH models, often involving 
endogenous regimes in parameters (e.g., Hamao et al., 1990, Gebka and Serwa, 2007, Chiu et al., 2015, 
Dungey et al., 2015, Mollah et al., 2016), copulas (Philippas and Siriopoulos, 2013), etc.2 
Regarding the definition of contagion, a consensus appears to be forming that interrelationships, 
or return spillovers, among stock markets worldwide are a natural and rational phenomenon, as 
countries are linked to each other by economic fundamentals, such as foreign trade and FDI, common 
bank creditors, and actions of portfolio investors. These investors can rationally respond to common 
news, liquidity shocks, changes in wealth inducing risk aversion variations, or can hedge against 
macroeconomic risks.3 Hence, it can be rational for stock markets to move together over time, and for 
those comovements to be stronger, for example, in periods of high volatility. Only if those comovements 
become excessively high and cannot be attributed solely to changes in fundamental links between 
markets, can financial contagion be assumed (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002, Karolyi, 2003, Boyer et al., 
2006, etc.).  
One problem of such a definition immediately becomes apparent, however: how does one 
discriminate between fundamentals-based and contagious (excessive) spillovers? One approach is to 
attempt to explicitly model the dependence of inter-market linkages on observed variables which proxy 
economic fundamentals, such as exchange rates, foreign trade, state of the banking system, 
macroeconomic condition of the domestic economy, industry structure (mis-)alignment, informational 
links with the world, etc. (Ng, 2000, Bekaert et al., 2005, Bekaert et al., 2014, Baele and Inghelbrecht, 
2010). Contagion is identified in this approach when, for example, idiosyncratic country shocks derived 
from such a factor model are still dependent on foreign markets during crisis, or when there is an 
                                                     
2 See, for example, Dungey et al. (2005) and Forbes (2012) for a review of definitions and methods of testing for 
existence of contagion. In addition, rather than concentrating on links between first moments of return distribution, 
alternative approaches deal with interdependences between return volatilities (e.g., Engle and Susmel, 1993, 
Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009, Chiang and Wang, 2011), or certain quantiles of return distribution (e.g., Candelon 
and Tokpavi, 2016), or via the multivariate extreme value theory (e.g., Bae et al., 2003, Longin and Solnik, 2001, 
Boyer et al., 2006). 
3 Gagnon and Karolyi (2006) review the literature on financial spillovers, and Pritsker (2001) and Forbes (2012) 
offer reviews of channels of spillovers and contagion. 
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unexpected increase in those residual correlations or factor loadings, that is, if changes in those 
fundamentals explicitly accounted for cannot fully capture the observed dependence of one market on 
another.  
This fundamentals-based approach suffers from some drawbacks, however. Firstly, it is not clear 
which precise variables should be included in such a model to fully capture the impact of fundamentals 
on interdependencies among markets, which could lead to possible model misspecifications due to 
omitted variable bias and so potential incorrect inference about existence of contagion. Secondly, as 
many empirical proxies of fundamentals are only available at low frequencies, a researcher is left with 
either too few observations in the crisis period (when fitting the model to low frequency data), or high 
persistence and low volatility of explanatory variables (when regressing high frequency stock returns 
on low frequency economic variables), especially if the crisis period under investigation was short.4 
Accordingly, inference might be misleading, as there is too little data available to present an accurate 
picture of the impact of fundamentals. 
An alternative, more straightforward approach to capture contagion is to test for a statistically 
significant increase in comovements between markets in a crisis versus a pre-crisis period, which allows 
for utilisation of higher frequency data. This is the “shift contagion” approach, as formalised by Forbes 
and Rigobon (2001), who see its major advantage in allowing one to identify contagion without having 
to measure the channels and causes of it. By testing for an increase in comovements it theoretically 
accommodates the established fundamentals-based interdependence.  
Using raw correlations for the purpose of identifying such shift contagion, as in King and 
Wadhwani (1990), can result in biased inference, however, as correlations tend to rise simply due to an 
increase in volatility in one market, even if the strength of the links between markets’ returns has not 
changed. Hence, either adjusted correlations are employed (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002), or, 
                                                     
4 Giving the complex nature of economic phenomena, one would expect many variables to be required to 
empirically capture macroeconomic fundamentals fully. Yet, Bekaert et al. (2005) find in their sample that only 
between three and seven variables contain unique information about fundamentals. This gives credence to the idea 
that explicit modelling of fundamentals is inherently difficult, and existing attempts appear to mostly capture 
common trends in the data. 
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alternatively, a measure of comovements such as the slope coefficient from a regression of one market’s 
return on another is investigated for an increase during crisis. The latter approach appears to be very 
popular in the literature.5 The common feature of these approaches is that they assume constant 
comovements within each sub-period.6  
Assuming sub-period constant comovements might be a misspecification, however. Empirical 
studies demonstrate that comovements between markets’ returns vary over time and tend to follow 
upward trends due to progressing globalisation (e.g., Brière et al., 2012, Baele and Inghelbrecht, 2010, 
Pukthuanthong and Roll, 2009, Carrieri et al., 2007, Bekaert et al., 2011).7 In addition, linkages between 
markets during a crisis period are not time-invariant either, as several studies identify different phases 
within crisis episodes (Chiang et al., 2007, Fry-McKibbin et al., 2014, Dungey and Gajurel, 2014, 
Dungey et al., 2015, Kenourgios and Dimitriou, 2015). Failing to capture such trends in comovement 
(betas) in a model comparing pre- and crisis periods could bias inference about existence of contagion. 
It will falsely identify contagion where a higher level of spillovers at the end of the sample period would 
have been observed even in the absence of a crisis, due to a long-term trend in financial integration 
among markets (globalisation), for example. Furthermore, it would not capture short-lived contagion 
within a longer crisis period, given the assumed time invariance of comovements within periods. 
Our work contributes to the existing literature in several ways. Firstly, we propose a new method 
to empirically discriminate between contagion and those changes in linkages between financial markets 
which only occur due to long-run processes such as globalisation or disintegration. Our approach does 
not require an identification of fundamental variables, and is applicable to easily available, higher-
frequency return data. Hence, it can be considered as an improved implementation of the “shift 
                                                     
5 Relevant studies determine the timing of the crisis period endogenously to the model (Baele, 2005, Białkowski 
et al., 2006, Gebka and Serwa, 2006, Blatt et al., 2015), exogenously to the model but endogenously to return data 
(Baur, 2012, Dungey and Gajurel, 2014, Dungey and Gajurel, 2015, Fry-McKibbin et al., 2014), or exogenously 
to both (Beirne and Gieck, 2014, Chiu et al., 2015). 
6 This branch of the literature is vast, some relevant examples include: Allegret et al. (2017); Baur (2012); Blatt 
et al. (2015); Brière et al. (2012); Climent and Meneu (2003); Dungey and Gajurel (2015); Dungey et al. (2015); 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2017); Forbes and Rigobon (2002); Fry-McKibbin et al. (2014); Gebka and Serwa 
(2006); Kenourgios and Dimitriou (2015); Rigobon (2003); Støve et al. (2014), etc. 
7 Reversals of globalisation, or disintegration, and no trends in integration are also possible, but empirically less 
relevant in our dataset, as demonstrated in the empirical part. Even if we mostly give examples based on 
progressing globalisation, our model is flexible and allows for any trend, positive or negative, or lack of trends in 
the integration process.  
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contagion” definition by Forbes and Rigobon (2001), and in allowing for trends in financial linkages, 
builds on Bekaert et al. (2005) and related papers without the complexity of their approach. Secondly, 
our model allows contagion to occur only during specific stages of the crisis. Thirdly, rather than 
generating a yes/no answer to the contagion question, it allows us to distinguish among different 
occurrences of contagion, which we term “shock”, “recoupling” and “kink” contagion. Lastly, as an 
illustration of our method, the empirical analysis of the 2007-9 episode shows that genuine contagion 
was less common than what could have been concluded using standard approaches, and that it occurred 
in different forms and at different phases of the crisis period in different countries. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes our framework to identify 
financial contagion. Empirical methodology and data are presented in Sections 3 and 4, respectively, 
whereas Section 5 describes the results and Section 6 summarises our findings and concludes. 
 
2 Identifying Financial Contagion 
This section places our model within the framework of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and others,8 who 
abstract away from specifying a detailed factor model of interactions between financial linkages and 
economic fundamentals. We show how this approach can be employed to straightforwardly identify 
contagion as a result of a crisis episode, yet still account for trends in cross-country correlations, thus 
incorporating some of the advantages of the factor model approach (Bekaert et al. (2005), (2014)). 
2.1 The Subperiod-Specific Constant Spillovers Model 
The starting point for our considerations is the model of financial contagion which assumes 
spillover parameters to be constant in subperiods (as, e.g., in Baur (2012)): 
 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑊,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑊,𝑡𝐷𝑡,𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
                                                     
8 For instance, Climent and Meneu, 2003, Rigobon, 2003, Gebka and Serwa, 2006, Baur, 2012,  Brière et al., 
2012, Støve et al., 2014, Fry-McKibbin et al., 2014, Blatt et al., 2015, Kenourgios and Dimitriou, 2015, Dungey 
and Gajurel, 2015, Dungey et al., 2015, Allegret et al. (2017), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2017). 
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where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 denotes stock returns in country i at time t, 𝐷𝑡,𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 is a dummy variable equal to one during 
the crisis period and zero otherwise, and  𝑅𝑊,𝑡 is the return on the world stock market index at time t. 
The coefficients 𝛽 measure the average impact of world market returns on returns in country i during 
the non-crisis (𝛽1) and crisis (𝛽1 + 𝛽2) period. Contagion is defined in this approach as a significant 
positive change in the impact of the world stock market returns on individual country’s returns during 
the crisis period, i.e., 𝛽𝟐 > 0.  
There are several implicit assumptions underlying this modelling approach. Firstly, it assumes 
pre- and post-crisis periods to be identical in terms of the effect the world market exerts on country i 
(i.e., 𝛽1 is implicitly assumed to be identical pre- and post-crisis). Since in (1) 𝛽2 captures the change 
in average return comovement over and above the non-crisis period (i.e., both pre- and post-crisis), but 
contagion is defined as an increase in 𝛽 as compared to the pre-crisis period, if the pre-crisis and post-
crisis periods’ 𝛽s are different, the coefficient 𝛽2 as given by (1) will be biased.
9 Secondly, this model 
imposes a restriction that the intercept term, 𝛼0, is fixed across subperiods, confining all the effects 
from the crisis to manifest themselves in the slope coefficient 𝛽𝟐. Hence, it rules out, for example, a 
level shift in country i's conditional returns caused by the crisis, which can result in biased estimates of 
𝛽2 and, hence, incorrect inference about the existence of contagion. Model (1) could be modified to 
address these two concerns: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑡,𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑡,𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆   
 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑊,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑊,𝑡𝐷𝑡,𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑊,𝑡𝐷𝑡,𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1’) 
where 𝐷𝑡,𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 is a dummy variable equal to one in the post-crisis period and zero otherwise. 
However, model (1) and (1’) still assume that the links between the world and the national market 
are constant within each subperiod (i.e., 𝛽  are not time-varying). This feature does not allow for trends 
in financial linkages prior to, during, and after the crisis period (due to, for example, progressing 
globalisation), nor does it allow contagion to evolve during the crisis period. In addition, contagion 
                                                     
9 This bias increases with the length of the post-crisis period and/or the degree of difference between the pre- and 
post-crisis periods. The bias would however be zero if there were no post-crisis period. 
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might be short-lived, and although perhaps being evident for part of the crisis period, (1) and (1’) will 
only capture contagion if its effect is strong enough to dominate the entire crisis period. And yet, if 
contagion is evident for even a short time, a robust test should be able to identify it. Below, we propose 
an extension to these models and provide a detailed demonstration of how a model such as (1) can 
misspecify the existence of contagion. 
2.2 The Globalisation Model  
To address the potential issues identified with model (1) we propose a new model which we refer 
to as the ‘Globalisation Model’: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑡,𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑡,𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆   
+ 𝛽1𝑡𝑅𝑊,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑅𝑊,𝑡𝐷𝑡,𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝛽3𝑡𝑅𝑊,𝑡𝐷𝑡,𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
where: 
 𝛽1𝑡 =  𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑡     (2A) 
 𝛽2𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑡 (2B) 
 𝛽3𝑡 =  𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑡 (2C) 
 and 𝑡 represents a deterministic time trend10.  
Model (2) differs from (1) in a number of respects. First, it allows the impact of the world on 
the national market between the pre- and the post-crisis period, to differ, as modelled by coefficients 
𝛽1𝑡 and 𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑡, respectively. Hence, the post-crisis period is not assumed to be identical with the 
pre-crisis one (𝛽3𝑡 can be different from zero). Second, (2) allows for changes in the intercept across 
all subperiods. Hence, it incorporates those extensions outlined in (1’). 
Third, and most importantly, it allows for a (linear) temporal development in the level of 
linkages (𝛽) between the stock market of country i and the world, a process which can be different in 
each subperiod. This is achieved by allowing each parameter 𝛽 to be a function of time t.11 In the pre-
                                                     
10 This contagion model can be estimated by substituting (2A), (2B), and (2C) into equation (2). To calculate the 
value of 𝛽1𝑡  at any timepoint t = 𝜏, denoted 𝛽1(𝜏), we use estimates of ?̂?0 and ?̂?1 as per (2A), i.e., ?̂?1(𝜏) =  ?̂?0 +
?̂?1𝜏, and analogously for 𝛽2(𝜏) and 𝛽3(𝜏). 
11 Here, we model long term trends in market integration as linear functions of time. More complex, non-linear 
processes could be imposed, but at a risk of capturing transitory variations in market integration trends rather than 
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crisis state, 𝛿1 measures the pace of globalisation, while in the crisis period, the difference in the pace 
of globalisation from its pre-crisis trajectory is given by 𝛾1; post-crisis, the difference in the pace of 
globalisation from the pre-crisis period is given by 𝜃1. Hence, the new model, (2), allows for temporal 
variation of 𝛽𝑡 within each subperiod, addressing an issue with (1) described above. Figure 1 shows a 
diagrammatic representation of how these coefficients could be considered in terms of the temporal 
development of 𝛽𝑡 parameters. 
[Figure 1 around here] 
In summary, model (2) addresses all the main concerns identified with (1), and is a more 
flexible specification than those assuming subperiod-specific constant integration levels, as exemplified 
by (1). It should be noted that (2) nests (1): if 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛿1, 𝛾1, and 𝛽3𝑡 are all constrained to be zero, then 
(1) results. Only where this is the case would there be no potential misspecification bias in using (1) as 
opposed to (2). 
The most important feature of (2) is that the degree of stock market integration, 𝛽𝑡, is not 
assumed to be constant over time in each subperiod (as was the case in (1)), but is allowed to evolve 
over time as a result of, for instance, increasing globalisation in the pre-crisis period. In (1) with constant 
subperiod betas, contagion was defined as a significant increase in 𝛽 due to crisis’ outbreak (𝛽𝟐 > 0). 
However, if 𝛽 is, for example, increasing over time due to progressing globalisation, then the average 
𝛽𝑡 in the later part of any sample will always be higher than the average 𝛽𝑡 in the earlier part of the 
same sample, even if there was no crisis towards the end of the sample (or if the crisis was present but 
did not affect the financial integration process 𝛽𝑡). Hence, (1) will tend to find “contagion” (defined as 
an increase in average 𝛽𝑡) even when there is none, provided there is a process of increasing integration. 
Therefore, we define contagion not as an increase in average 𝛽𝑡 but as existence of higher values of 𝛽𝑡 
                                                     
genuine long-run processes. Unnecessary overparametrisation of trends will also result in lower efficiency of all 
model’s parameter estimates, potentially leading to incorrect inference about their significance. Unreported 
empirical tests for existence of higher-order trend components strongly suggest that the linear specification is the 
most appropriate one to use, too. 
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in the crisis period compared to what would have been expected if the evolution of 𝛽𝑡 observed pre-
crisis continued unaffected into the crisis period. 
To further explain our definition of contagion, which accounts for pre-crisis trends in financial 
interdependence as measured by 𝛽𝑡, as well as the difference between the identification of contagion in 
(1) versus (2), Figure 2 provides examples of two hypothetical cases, assuming no post-crisis period for 
simplicity. The solid lines show values of 𝛽𝑡 coefficients implied by model (2), in pre-crisis (𝛽1𝑡) and 
crisis (𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡) period. The dotted lines represent average (fixed) values of 𝛽𝑡 in each subperiod, as 
would have been measured by (1). The lighter dashed line in the crisis period indicates β values which 
should be expected in the crisis period if there had been no impact of the crisis on the process of market 
integration 𝛽𝑡 (i.e., no contagion, which assumes 𝛾0 = 𝛾1 = 0 in (2)), and is obtained by extrapolation 
of the pre-crisis process in 𝛽𝑡 (i.e., 𝛽𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑡 =  𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑡). In example A, the slope of the solid line pre-
crisis is 𝛿1 > 0 but during crisis(𝛿1 + 𝛾1) < 0; in other words, the process of integration or 
globalisation reverses following the outbreak of the crisis at time 𝑡 = 𝜏1. In example B the process of 
integration increases following the outbreak of crisis, since 𝛿1 > 0 and 𝛾1 > 0 given the increased slope 
of the solid line during the crisis period. 
[Figure 2 examples A and B around here] 
It is evident that the outbreak of the crisis has affected the financial integration process (solid 
line), as, in example A, there is a discontinuity in 𝛽𝑡 at crisis’ start, and the intertemporal behaviour of 
𝛽𝑡 has changed in the crisis as well (market i increases its integration with the world market pre-crisis 
but is dis-integrating from it in the crisis period). In addition, 𝛽𝑡 values in the first phase of the crisis 
are not only higher than pre-crisis but also higher than they would have been (dashed line) if the crisis 
had no effect on the financial integration process (𝛽𝑡). Hence, one would conclude that there is evidence 
of contagion. However, using a definition of contagion that the average level of financial spillovers (𝛽𝑡) 
is higher following the outbreak of a crisis (as in (1)), one would incorrectly conjecture that there was 
no contagion, as the average 𝛽𝑡 during the crisis period is actually lower, not higher, than the average 
pre-crisis 𝛽𝑡 (dotted lines).  
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Example B provides another demonstration of differences between model (1) and (2). This 
time, we demonstrate a negative shock to the financial integration process (𝛽𝑡) at crisis’ start (t = 𝜏1), 
followed by a higher pace of globalisation process during the crisis (as indicated by a higher slope of 
𝛽𝑡). If one defined contagion as a rise in the average level of financial spillovers (𝛽𝑡) pre- versus during 
the crisis, the conclusion would be that contagion was observed here, as the average 𝛽𝑡 is higher 
following the crisis’ inception (dotted lines). However, it can also be observed that 𝛽𝑡 values during the 
crisis (solid line) are lower, not higher, than they would have been if the pre-crisis process in 𝛽𝑡 
continued unchanged into the crisis period, i.e., if the crisis’ outbreak did not affect the financial 
integration process (dashed line). Hence, the observed values of 𝛽𝑡 are relatively too low during the 
crisis, which we suggest is to be interpreted as weaker, not stronger, comovements in the crisis period, 
i.e., no contagion but rather decoupling. 
In addition to the more robust identification of contagion, model (2) also allows for insights into 
the exact intertemporal nature of the financial integration process in each subperiod. For instance, in 
Figure 2A it would unveil a very high level of spillovers at the beginning of the crisis and a reversal of 
the financial integration process following the crisis’ outbreak, both important features of financial 
integration which would remain unnoticed if one was employing a model of constant subpriod 𝛽𝑡 
coefficients, as exemplified by (1).  
2.3 Identifying and Testing for Contagion 
Contagious propagation of financial shocks originating abroad can, and should, be expected to 
take on different forms. Firstly, for countries with strong links in external fundamentals such as trade 
and portfolio capital flows, one would expect an increased level of comovements; however, this could 
be fully due to changes in those external fundamental linkages and, hence, not excessive, i.e., non-
contagious. Alternatively, especially if one allows for the existence of irrational investors and their 
herding, stock markets could be overreacting to news of crisis outbreaks abroad, leading to excessive 
comovements, i.e., initial contagion. Similarly, as proposed in the “wake up call” hypothesis of 
contagion by Goldstein (1998), a crisis outbreak abroad could draw investors’ attention to problems 
with fundamentals at home, resulting in a downward reassessment of financial asset values. However, 
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a crisis outbreak in one country could also lead investors to re-evaluate their positions in other countries 
by focusing on country-specific, domestic macroeconomic fundamentals, leading to weaker 
comovements if fundamentals differ among countries, i.e., the opposite of contagion. In addition to 
those differentiated initial reactions, stock markets linkages can become stronger or weaker throughout 
the crisis period depending on whether countries’ fundamentals become more (in case of, for example, 
a global recession) or less (if policy responses to crisis outbreak differ across countries) correlated over 
time, whether portfolio investors differentiate between countries with different fundamentals or not (for 
example, due to increased uncertainty, a “flight to quality/liquidity” which treats groups of countries as 
largely homogenous may occur), etc.  
Hence, on purely theoretical grounds we can state that, firstly, different short- and long-term 
reactions to a crisis outbreak are possible, and, secondly, it is not straightforward to theoretically predict 
which effects exactly will prevail, and when. However, our framework encapsulated by model (2) can 
empirically distinguish between three distinct forms of contagion. These forms are mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive, i.e., there is no contagion type which is not captured by one of the three forms presented 
here.   
[Figure 3 examples A, B and C around here] 
2.3.1 Shock Contagion 
We define the term “shock contagion” as a positive jump in comovements (𝛽𝑡) between the 
stock market of the individual country and the world stock market portfolio following the outbreak of 
the crisis (Figure 3A). In other words, it means that 𝛽2𝑡 > 0 at the starting point of the crisis period 
(𝑡 = 𝜏1). Following this initial rise in co-movements of domestic stock returns with the world market, 
there are different scenarios which may occur during the crisis period, i.e., an increase (𝛾1> 0), a decline 
(𝛾1< 0), or no change (𝛾1= 0) in the slope of the linkages between the domestic and the world market 
during the crisis, as compared with the pre-crisis period. In all of these situations, “shock contagion” is 
identified if, following the outbreak of a crisis, the value of 𝛽𝑡 at crisis’ onset is higher than it would 
have been had the pre-crisis integration process still prevailed. This type of market reaction at crisis’ 
onset would correspond to the “wake up call” hypothesis of contagion by Goldstein (1998), but could 
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also be generated by irrational changes in investors’ sentiment leading to overreactions, especially when 
combined with their herding behaviour. 
Empirically, “shock contagion” exists if there is a significant difference in comovements at 
crisis’ onset between model-implied crisis-specific ?̂?t (= ?̂?1(𝜏1) + ?̂?2(𝜏1)) and what would be observed 
in absence of disruptions in the financial integration process (?̂?1(𝜏1)). If there is a significant positive 
difference (i.e., ?̂?2(𝜏1) > 0 ), this provides evidence for the existence of shock contagion.
12 
2.3.2 Recoupling Contagion 
We define “recoupling contagion” as an initial fall in comovements between the individual 
stock market and the world stock market (𝛽2𝑡 < 0 at 𝑡 = 𝜏1), followed by a subsequent rise in 𝛽𝑡 above 
the level which would have prevailed had there been no impact due to the crisis (Figure 3B). This 
situation can be defined as contagion only if there is an increase in the slope (𝛾1> 0) during the crisis 
period, as this is a necessary condition for 𝛽𝑡 to be higher at a certain point during the crisis than what 
it would have been if the trend of the integration process had been the same as in the pre-crisis period. 
With this increase in slope, 𝛽𝑡 has to be higher at the end of the crisis period than what it would have 
been if the prior integration process had prevailed. For the “recoupling contagion” to exist, it is 
irrelevant whether the slopes of financial integration process 𝛽𝑡  pre- and during crisis are positive or 
negative; but the latter period has to have a higher slope than the former. Initial decoupling could be 
observed when investors re-evaluate their positions in other countries by focusing on country-specific, 
domestic macroeconomic fundamentals, leading to weaker comovements if fundamentals differ among 
countries. Subsequent recoupling with the world could occur due to similarities in states’ responses to 
the crisis, inducing stronger correlations among their fundamentals, or a recovery in economic links 
such as trade and international investment. As crisis outbreak would have acted as a wake-up call and 
attracted investors’ attention to previously overlooked economic problems, a long-term result might be 
contagion. 
                                                     
12 Where the standard error of the coefficient 𝛽2t at time t, 𝑆𝐸(𝛽2𝑡), is calculated as: 𝑆𝐸(𝛽2𝑡)
2=𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑡) = 
(𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛾0) + 𝑡
2𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛾1) + 2𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝛾0, 𝛾1) = [𝑆𝐸(𝛾0)]
2 + 𝑡2[𝑆𝐸(𝛾1)]
2 + 2𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝛾0, 𝛾1). 
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Empirically, a suitable test is to find that 𝛽2(𝜏1) < 0 and 𝛽2(𝜏2) > 0 (where 𝜏1 and  𝜏2 stand 
for the first and the last observation of the crisis period, respectively). 
2.3.3 Kink Contagion 
Unlike in the previous two situations, “kink contagion” can occur when there is no abrupt 
change in co-movements between the individual country and the world stock portfolio during the first 
week of the crisis (i.e., 𝛽2𝑡 = 0 at the starting point of the crisis, 𝑡 = 𝜏1). Instead, contagion is identified 
provided there is an increase in the slope (𝛾1 > 0) during the crisis period and consequently 𝛽𝑡 is higher 
during the crisis than what it would be if the integration process has been the same as in the pre-crisis 
period (Figure 3C). For the “kink contagion” to prevail, it is irrelevant whether the slopes of financial 
integration process 𝛽𝑡 pre- and during crisis are positive or negative; but the latter period has to have a 
higher slope than the former. Existence of kink contagion could indicate a gradual but lasting impact of 
crisis outbreak on spillover channels such as trade, bank lending, and investment, leading to a long-
term change in spillovers as compared to their pre-crisis trends. An increased homogeneity among 
affected countries due to similarities in their policy and economic responses to a crisis would also result 
in such an increase in financial linkages over time. If investors exaggerate those commonalities due to 
asymmetric information and general uncertainty in crisis, contagion might result. 
Empirically, we firstly test whether 𝛽2(𝜏1) = 0 against a two-tailed alternative, and, secondly, 
whether the slope of the integration process is significantly higher during the crisis period (𝛾1 > 0) than 
what it would be if the pre-crisis integration process continued unchanged into the crisis period.13  
2.3.4 Summary of identification and testing 
A summary of the empirical testing approach is given in Figure 4. It should be noted that the 
post-crisis period is not directly employed for these definitions. Rather we need an accurate picture of 
the long-run pre-crisis process, so this can be extrapolated through the crisis period and compared to 
the crisis period levels. 
                                                     
13 Alternatively, instead of testing for an increase in slope (𝛾1 > 0), one could test whether 𝛽2𝑡 at the end of the 
crisis period is significantly higher than what it would be in absence of the crisis, i.e., 𝛽2(𝜏2) > 0. 
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[Figure 4 around here] 
Therefore, identifying contagion in any of those three types constitutes an improved 
implementation of the “shift contagion” concept by Forbes and Rigobon (2001), as it indicates a 
significant increase in linkages between markets after a shock occurred. The benefit of our approach is 
that it accounts for time-variations in linkages during each subperiod, and also allows for a more 
nuanced view into how and when exactly contagion struck a given market. Existence of such re-
identified “shift contagion” would support the validity of crisis-contingent theories of shock 
propagation, which attribute contagion to the existence of multiple equilibria due to investor 
psychology, endogenous liquidity shocks, and political economy (see Forbes and Rigobon, 2001, for a 
detailed exposition of this argument). 
 
3 Methodology 
Stock market data is well known to display volatility clustering and excess kurtosis, hence model (2) is 
estimated within a GARCH framework. A further benefit of this framework is that it overcomes a 
shortcoming of simple OLS which, in the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity, might yield 
inefficient inference (Hamilton, 2010). More specifically, the Glosten et al. (1993), or GJR, variant of 
GARCH is employed as this model also captures asymmetries in volatility resulting from positive 
versus negative shocks. Model (2) constitutes the mean equation, whereas the conditional volatility, ,i th  
is modelled for each country as a GJR-GARCH (p,q) process: 
   2 2, , , , , , ,
1 1
p q
i t i i j i j i t j i t j i k i t k
j k
h a g I b h   
 
        (3) 
where , 1i t jI   if , 0i t j    and is equal to zero otherwise, ,i t j   represents the error term from 
equation (2), for country i, lagged j periods, and it is assumed this error can be decomposed as 
, , ,i t i t i th v   with  , ~ 0,1i tv iid . This model allows for the impact of past shocks on conditional 




  or negative 
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  , ,1
p
i j i jj
g

 . Typically for stock market data, one expects , 0i jg   , i.e., for a negative shock 
at lag j to exert a larger impact on conditional volatility of stock returns than a positive shock of the 
same magnitude, a phenomenon known as the leverage effect (Black, 1976). The GJR-GARCH nests 
both the GARCH model, which imposes no asymmetries ( , 0i jg  ), and the more restrictive ARCH 
model, ( , , 0i j i kg b  ).
14 
The combined model (2)-(3) is subjected to a battery of specification tests. Firstly, the (log) 
indices (𝑃𝑖,𝑡) and returns     , , , 1ln lni t i t i tR P P    are tested for stationarity using both the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and the Phillips and Perron (1988) tests using the 
Enders (2010) sequential procedure to select the most appropriate model (with or without deterministic 
components), to ensure that only stationary variables are used in equation (2) avoiding potential 
spurious regression.  Second, given that indices at the first step are found to be non-stationary, we test 
for cointegration between the world and each national (log) index, as existence of cointegration would 
necessitate an inclusion of an error correction term into equation (2) to circumvent the omitted variable 
bias; this is accomplished by employing both the Engle and Granger (1987) test using Mackinnon 
(1996) critical values, and the Johansen (1991) cointegration test. For the latter, in addition to the trace 
and eigenvalue statistics, we also employ an alternative approach suggested by Gonzalo and Pitarakis 
(1998) and Aznar and Salvador (2002) to determine the number of co-integrating equations in a VECM: 
a consistent estimator of the number of co-integrating equations is provided by choosing the number of 
co-integrating equations that minimizes the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC). 
The mean equation (2) is firstly estimated by OLS and the residuals are tested for conditional 
heteroskedasticity using the Engle ARCH LM test. Existence of conditional heteroskedasticity provides 
further rationale for modelling the error terms within a GARCH framework. The GJR-GARCH model 
is fitted assuming a normal distribution of error terms at first, and the resulting residuals are tested for 
normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test. Where non-normality is found, model (2)-(3) is re-estimated 
                                                     
14 A GARCH specification captures the time-varying conditional volatility and existence of volatility “regimes”, 
even though coefficients of the conditional volatility equation are not time-varying themselves. 
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under the assumption that residuals follow t-distribution or GED (generalised error) distribution. 
Subsequently, the final distribution decision (normal, t, or GED) is made based on the information 
criteria (AIC and SBIC), and model (2)-(3) is re-estimated. Next, Ljung-Box Q statistics are employed 
to test whether there remains autocorrelation in residuals, and where required, these are modelled as an 
ARMA process of an appropriate order established empirically. Lastly, we test whether using a GJR-
GARCH specification fully captures the ARCH effects in residuals by applying Engle’s LM ARCH test 
to standardised residuals. 
We employ a general-to-specific approach in estimation of model (2)-(3). Initially, the full 
model allowing for linear trends in coefficients 𝛽𝑡 in each subperiod is estimated. Next, those trend 
coefficients found insignificant are dropped from the regression and the reduced model (2) is estimated. 
This ensures that the precision of parameter estimates is not negatively affected by the presence of 
unnecessary variables. 
4 Data  
For the main stock index in each of 25 major world economies, daily closing prices in local currency 
are obtained from DataStream for the period 27th October 1979 to 27th March 2012.15 We employ indices 
estimated by DataStream rather than that from other providers (for example, the national stock 
exchanges) as the former are based on a common methodology and, hence, more comparable across 
countries than the latter. We calculate weekly Tuesday-close-to-Tuesday-close returns, as previously 
defined, resulting in 1,693 weeks in the sample, as using weekly data helps to mitigate issues resulting 
from day-of-the-week effects and nonsynchronous trading due to time-zone differences, an issue which 
plagues daily return observations. Tuesdays are chosen because this minimises the number of non-
trading days, hence maximises the sample size, while also reducing the influence of day-of-the-week 
effects on prices. The countries included are: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, France, Germany, 
                                                     
15 Mink (2015) demonstrates that returns converted into a common currency also reflect fluctuations in exchange 
rates, which biases inference about contagion. The sample does not contain more recent observations as otherwise 
the post-crisis period would be too heterogeneous, especially given economic and political turbulences which took 




Hong Kong, Indonesia, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, South Africa, South 
Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, UK, and US.  
To determine the precise beginning and the end of the crisis period, dates from Baur (2012) are 
used.16 His procedure firstly involves considering both major financial and economic events from the 
timelines provided by the Bank for International Settlements (Filardo et al., 2010). The second step uses 
estimates of conditional volatility in the financial sector returns (as this is where the initial shock 
originated), estimated using a GJR-GARCH(1,1) model with a constant in the mean equation, and 
identifies the crisis as a period where this volatility exceeds a given threshold. Results from these two 
steps are combined and the resulting crisis period spans from 7 August 2007 to 24 March 2009.17, 18 
To obtain the best proxy of the global stock market, W, with return 𝑅𝑊,𝑡 in equation (2), we 
consider two candidates: the world stock market index constructed by DataStream, as it captures 
movements in most of the national stock markets world-wide, and DataStream’s US stock market index, 
as the global financial crisis of 2007-9 is widely believed to have originated in that country. We estimate 
model (2)-(3) for each country i with each of those global market proxies at a time, and, based on AIC 
and SBIC information criteria, the world stock market index is found to provide a better model fit across 
the board.  Hence, the world stock market index is employed as a proxy of the global market in equation 
(2) in the subsequent analysis. 
                                                     
16 Dungey et al. (2015) review the literature on dating of the 2007-9 crisis and estimate the start and end point of 
a crisis using a smooth transition GARCH model. Their estimated centre of transition into (out of) the crisis period 
is 3 July 2007 (15 May 2009), which implies that the financial markets were fully in the crisis regime after (before) 
those dates. This corresponds well with the dates employed here, as do those dates in other relevant papers 
reviewed in Dungey et al. (2015), Figure 1. We also test for robustness of our results to changes in crisis dates in 
section 5.3. 
17 The resulting definition of the pre-GFC subperiod does not imply any assumptions of the absence of any crises 
pre-2007. Rather, the pre-crisis period is selected to be long to allow us to appropriately capture a long-term trend 
in financial integration, which would have been taking place despite of multiple crises potentially disrupting this 
process. In addition, a long pre-crisis period allows for reduction of noise in trend estimation as well as 
improvements in efficiency of all parameter estimates. Likewise, this is not to say that there was no crisis in any 
of the sample countries after March 2009; rather, these dates only delineate the very crisis we are focusing on in 
this paper, the GFC.  
18 The crisis date is identical for all countries considered as we focus on the change in spillovers from the world 
portfolio when the world market, and not a given national market, is showing signs of a crisis. Our model (2) 
implicitly allows for capturing differences in timing of reactions to the crisis manifesting itself in movements of 
the world portfolio returns, by differentiating among three types of contagion. 
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Descriptive statistics of weekly returns are presented in Table 1. On average, the crisis period is 
characterised by lower returns and higher return volatility, but also less negative skewness and lower 
kurtosis as compared to pre-crisis figures. These results indicate that return distribution during the crisis 
period was more spread-out and shifted to the left but also less asymmetric and with less heavy tails 
than its pre-crisis counterpart. This is maybe because the pre-crisis covers a longer time period 
containing a number of heterogeneous economic and political events affecting stock returns, which 
would have generated extreme positive and, more likely, negative returns so contributing to the 
distribution’s asymmetry and its heavy tails. The post-crisis returns are, on average, higher and less 
volatile than the pre-crisis ones, but also less asymmetric and heavy-tailed than the pre-crisis returns. 
Overall, returns characteristics appear to differ across sub-periods, which provides an additional 
rationale for modelling pre-, during, and post-crisis periods as distinctive regimes. 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
5 Empirical Results  
5.1 Data Features and Model Specifications 
This section provides a brief overview of results of data diagnostics and for model adequacy and 
specifications. As these test outcomes are not the core of our analysis, the exact numerical results are 
not reported but available on request. Firstly, both unit root tests (ADF and PP) show log indices to be 
nonstationary but returns in each country to be stationary. Secondly, the Engle-Granger cointegration 
test on log index values shows no evidence of cointegration between each national and the world market, 
neither for the whole sample nor when each subperiod (pre, post, and during the crisis) is analysed. 
Using the version of the Johansen cointegration test which chooses the number of co-integrating 
equations that minimizes the SBIC also shows no cointegration in the full sample and each of the sub-
samples. When using the original version of the Johansen test, however, we find cointegration for six 
countries for the full sample, but for those countries only up to three are cointegrated in each sub-period, 
and only at 5% level. It seems that the overwhelming evidence is against the existence of cointegration, 
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but we adopt a conservative approach and analyse how the inclusion of the error correction term into 
model (2) would change the inference about existence of contagion for those six countries potentially 
affected. The empirical results from our globalisation model show that the estimated parameter values 
and their standard errors are almost identical with and without the error correction term, indicating that 
one does not have to account for (possibly non-existent) cointegration in model (2) when applied to our 
data. 
Having established the form of equation (2), we estimate it using OLS and test for 
homoskedasticity of residuals: the results indicate that heteroskedasticity is present. Next, model (2)-
(3) allowing for conditional heteroskedasticity is estimated, the assumption of error normality is then 
investigated using the Shapiro Wilk test. The results show that the null hypothesis of normality should 
be rejected. Hence, we re-estimate model (2)-(3) assuming a student-t distribution and a GED 
distribution. The results indicate that both the AIC and SBIC favour a student-t distribution for the 
residuals in (2). Having re-estimated the model assuming that the error term follows a t-distribution we 
test for autocorrelation in residuals, and in cases where it is found, the errors are modelled as an ARMA 
process of an appropriate order. The resulting residuals are not autocorrelated. Lastly, Engle’s LM 
ARCH test shows no remaining ARCH effects in residuals, suggesting that the models are correctly 
specified. 
5.2 Model Estimation Results 
Table 2 presents estimation results for equation (2). Firstly, we observe that in 9 out of 25 
countries, the intercept varies significantly across sub-periods (𝛼1 or 𝛼2 significant), supporting our 
earlier suggestion that imposing a time-constant intercept is a source of misspecification when 
describing the behaviour of returns over time. Secondly, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the 
coefficient 𝛽𝑡 capturing the interdependence between the local and the global financial markets is time-
varying before the crisis, as indicated by significance of 𝛿1
19. In all but one case, the positive sign on 
𝛿1 indicates that financial integration was increasing over time in the pre-crisis period. Hence, if these 
                                                     
19 Missing values for 𝛿1 are due to its insignificance in the first pass of the estimation, hence were dropped and 
the model was re-estimated to increase efficiency of remaining estimates. 
21 
 
positive trends had continued unchanged into the crisis period (𝛾0 = 𝛾1 = 0) but were not accounted 
for (as in model (1)), one would be at risk of falsely inferring that there was contagion during the 2007-
9 crisis period, even if there was none. However, these trends in globalisation appear to change 
significantly in the crisis and post-crisis periods in most countries, compared to the pre-crisis period, as 
indicated by the significance of coefficients 𝛾 and 𝜃. These changes could give rise to one of the 
contagion phenomena as described above, and we proceed to investigate them in detail below. 
5.2.1 Shock contagion  
Table 3 provides estimation results necessary to assess the existence of all forms of contagion. 
Firstly, we notice that for six countries (Brazil, Canada, Russia, South Africa, Spain, and Switzerland), 
there was no change in the intertemporal process governing 𝛽𝑡, including at crisis’ onset, as 𝛾0 and 𝛾1 
are not significantly different from zero (at the 10% significance level). This means that the pre-crisis 
process of integration continued unchanged into the crisis period, hence there is no evidence of any type 
of contagion. Secondly, for another four countries (France, Germany, Mexico, and Sweden), there was 
a significant negative change in the level (𝛾0<0) but no change in the slope (𝛾1=0) of the integration 
process 𝛽𝑡, i.e., values of 𝛽𝑡 during the crisis are all significantly lower, not higher, than what they 
would have been if the crisis had not struck. Hence, there is no evidence of contagion for these countries, 
either. Rather, capital markets of these four countries seem to have decoupled and been integrated less, 
not more, with the world during the crisis period, as compared to their pre-crisis expected integration 
levels. 
Evidence of shock contagion can be found for four countries (New Zealand, Norway, Thailand, 
and the UK), as their stock markets experienced a significant upwards shift (𝛾0>0) in 𝛽𝑡 over and above 
of what one would expect by extrapolating pre-crisis trends in financial integration, where present. In 
addition, these countries did not record any significant changes in the pace of integration (𝛾1=0), which 
implies that their 𝛽𝑡 values increased at crisis’ onset and remained elevated, as compared to pre-crisis 
trends, throughout the entire crisis period. Hence, it was the level but not the pace of their financial 
integration with the world (not the slope of 𝛽𝑡) which was affected by the crisis. 
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Yet another, and more frequent, type of contagion is observed for countries where, 𝛽𝑡 
experiences a positive and significant shock at crisis’ start (t=𝜏1), but its slope decreases significantly 
as compared to the pre-crisis one (𝛾1<0). Countries which fall into this category are Australia, Chile, 
China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, India, Japan, and Taiwan. These initial positive shocks in 𝛽𝑡 are 
statistically significant, i.e., ?̂?2(𝜏1) > 0 as indicated by values of the t-statistics in Table 3, which 
constitutes evidence in favour of shock contagion. In addition, model (2) allows inference about the 
persistence of those initial contagious shocks. Firstly, they might have faded away quickly and the 
financial integration process during the remaining part of the crisis period might have been weaker, not 
stronger, than what would have been expected if pre-crisis trends prevailed. Alternatively, the initial 
shocks might have been more persistent and have prevailed, at least partially, throughout the entire 
crisis period. To differentiate between these two scenarios (temporary vs. persistent contagion shocks), 
we test whether 𝛽t in the last week of the crisis (t=𝜏2) is significantly different from its value which 
would have been expected at crisis’ end if the crisis have had no impact on the process of financial 
integration. Should the estimated 𝛽2(𝜏2) be significantly positive (negative) at crisis’ end, this would 
imply that the initial positive shock in 𝛽t has not completely faded away (has reversed and led to a 
lower-than-expected integration level), indicating partially persistent (temporary) contagious shocks. 
[Tables 2 and 3 around here] 
 The results show that the initial contagious shock was significantly permanent only for 
Australia, as its 𝛽2(𝜏2) estimate is positive and significant. For the rest of the relevant countries, the 
remainder of the initial positive shock at crisis’ end, ?̂?2(𝜏2), is negative and significant for Chile, 
Indonesia, Japan, and Taiwan, suggesting that initial contagious shocks tend to fade away and the level 
of integration during the later phases of the crisis was lower, not higher, than what should have been 
expected given pre-crisis trends in the integration process. For China, Hong Kong, and India, the initial 
shock appears to have completely vanished by the end of the crisis period (?̂?2(𝜏2) insignificant), with 
financial integration process 𝛽t returning to the path it would be on if no crisis had occurred. 
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5.2.2 Recoupling Contagion  
Contagion effects might also arise if there is a fall in 𝛽𝑡 following the outbreak of the crisis 
(i.e., 𝛽2(𝜏1) < 0), accompanied by a steady rise in the level of 𝛽𝑡 as the crisis unfolds, leading to a 
higher level of 𝛽𝑡 at a certain point during this turmoil period. In the case of recoupling contagion, this 
will result in co-movements being stronger by the end of the crisis period (i.e. t=𝜏2) than what they 
would have been if the pre-crisis globalisation process was followed, i.e., 𝛽2(𝜏2)> 0.  
The results in Table 3 show for both Italy and the US that the level of 𝛽𝑡 was lower on the first 
week of the crisis period (i.e. ?̂?2(𝜏1) <0), as compared with what would have been expected pre-crisis. 
However, there is an increase in the level of 𝛽𝑡 as the crisis continues, so that by the end of the turmoil 
period 𝛽𝑡  is higher than what it would have been if the same integration processes as in the pre-crisis 
period were being followed (?̂?2(𝜏2) > 0). 
However, in order to determine the significance of the fall in co-movement of Italy and the US 
with the world during the first week of the crisis, and whether 𝛽2(𝜏2) was indeed significantly higher 
at the end of the crisis period, as compared to what it would have been if the crisis did not occur, two t-
tests are conducted. The first t-test conducted for week 𝑡 = 𝜏1, which is the first week of the crisis, 
suggests that the null hypothesis of 𝛽2(𝜏2) ≥ 0 can be rejected at 5% and 1% level for Italy and the US, 
respectively. In other words, there has indeed been a significant fall in the co-movement with the world 
for the abovementioned countries. The second t-test is to ascertain whether the level of 𝛽𝑡 was 
significantly higher for the stock returns of Italy and the US on the last week of the crisis period (t=𝜏2), 
compared to what it would have been if the crisis did not occur. The results show that the null hypothesis 
of 𝛽2(𝜏2) ≤ 0 is rejected for Italy at 5% level, but cannot be rejected for the US. Hence, we conclude 
that there is evidence of recoupling contagion only for the Italian stock market, as its integration with 
the world market at crisis’ end was higher than it would have been in absence of the crisis. In contrast, 
the US market appears to have experienced a negative integration shock at crisis onset, from which it 
has fully recovered (as ?̂?2(𝜏2) is not significantly different from zero), but no evidence of contagion, 
i.e., excessive comovements, can be found for the US market. 
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5.2.3 Kink Contagion   
“Kink” contagion is referred to as a situation where there is no sudden change in comovements 
during the first week of the crisis (i.e., 𝛽2(𝜏1) = 0), but contagion can still be identified provided there 
is an increase in integration pace (𝛾1 > 0) during the crisis period and, consequently, 𝛽𝑡 is higher during 
the crisis than what it would have been if the pace of the integration process was the same as in the pre-
crisis period. In our sample, none of the countries appears to have experienced this type of contagion 
(Table 3). For South Korea, the t-test suggests that the null hypothesis of 𝛽2(𝜏1) = 0 cannot be rejected, 
but the change in the integration speed is negative, not positive. Hence, the South Korean market’s 
integration with the world was progressively weaker as the crisis unfolded, relatively to its pre-crisis 
pace, and it can be concluded that there is no evidence of kink contagion in our sample. 
5.3 Discussion of Empirical Results 
Out of 25 countries in our sample, there is evidence of contagion in 13 countries when using a 
model which allows for the existence of a post-crisis subperiod as well as for changes in the level of 
financial integration over time (model 2). When applying a specification such as model (1), i.e., with 
no separate post-crisis period and subperiod-specific time-invariant parameters, the results reported in 
Table 3, second-to-last column, indicate the existence of contagion in 18 out of 25 countries.20 Both 
models (1) and (2) find no contagion effects for Brazil, Germany, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and the US. 
However, the globalisation model (2) additionally indicates that there is no evidence of contagion for 
Canada, France, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea and Switzerland. Hence, a model with time-
invariant parameters appears to overestimate the occurrence of contagion, as argued in section 2 (18 vs 
13 instances in our empirical example). 
More generally, our empirical findings regarding the occurrence of contagion differ in seven out 
of 25 cases investigated, or 28% of the sample between models (1) and (2) (where model (1) reported 
contagion but model (2) did not, or vice versa). This high fraction of individually significant differences 
                                                     
20 Our results from model (1) differ slightly from the those in Baur (2012), where a shorter sample period was 
used: our data shows evidence of contagion in Russia but none in Mexico. 
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is much higher than what could have occurred due to chance at 10% significance level, and hence 
implies that model (2) shows a substantially different (superior) performance to that of model (1). 
An additional benefit of using the globalisation model (2) is that it allows for a more detailed 
description of contagious and non-contagious episodes. Firstly, not all contagions are equal: 12 
countries experience a positive shock to their co-movements with the world at crisis onset, i.e., “shock” 
contagion, whereas for Italy there is evidence of a negative initial shock followed by a speedy catching-
up process, i.e., “recoupling” contagion.  
Secondly, not even all shock contagions are equal. For instance, for some countries (e.g., 
Norway), the initial shock remains fully present across the entire crisis period, i.e., we observe a level 
shift in the strength of the globalisation process 𝛽𝑡. In other countries, the initial shock dies out over 
time, but with different end-effects. For instance, in Australia the initial shock appears to be at least 
partially permanent, as the level of integration remains significantly above what would be expected pre-
crisis for the end of crisis period. By contrast, in other countries (e.g., India), at crisis’ end the initial 
shock is no longer observable, which implies its transitory nature. In yet another set of countries (e.g., 
in Chile), the initial positive shock appears to have not only completely disappeared but reversed and 
became negative, i.e., the level of financial integration at crisis’ end is significantly lower, not higher, 
than what would have been expected based on pre-crisis trends in globalisation. This heterogeneity of 
markets’ responses to contagious shocks can only be revealed when implementing our globalisation 
model (2) with time-varying betas. 
Thirdly, there is also heterogeneity in responses to crisis outbreak among those countries which 
did not experience contagion. For instance, countries such as Brazil do not record any significant impact 
of the crisis period on their intertemporal process of financial integration (insignificant 𝛾0 and 𝛾1), and 
their pre-crisis process of comovements with the world (𝛿1 > 0) continues unchanged throughout the 
turbulent period. Furthermore, another group of countries has not experienced any contagion but has 
nevertheless been affected by the crisis’ outbreak: their comovements with the world became 
significantly weaker, not stronger, at crisis’ onset, and either remained so throughout the turbulent 
regime (e.g., France), or just caught up with their pre-crisis globalisation trend at crisis’ end (the US). 
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South Korea did not respond to the crisis initially but subsequently slowly drifted away from the world 
stock market as the crisis unfolded. Again, this heterogeneity in non-contagion cases can only be 
revealed when implementing our globalisation model (2). 
It is worth noting that the globalisation model (2) generates results which differ substantially 
from those obtained using model (1) not because it separates the post- from the pre-crisis period, but 
because it allow integration parameters to be time-varying within each subperiod. This can be 
demonstrated by estimating a model with a separate post-crisis period but which still imposes constancy 
of integration parameters in each subperiod (model 1’). The estimation results of that model regarding 
the presence of contagion are indicated in the last column of Table 3. It generates an almost identical 
set of results as model (1) except for two cases: it does not find evidence of contagion in Mexico, which 
is in line with model (2)’s findings, but it also fails to find contagion for Japan, even though model (2) 
indicates that the Japanese market experienced shock contagion. Hence, the differences in results 
between model (1) and (2) are due to the fact that the latter allows for time variations in financial 
integration within each subperiod. This confirms the importance of allowing the process of integration 
to be time varying, as in our model (2). 
As a robustness test, we vary the timing of the crisis episode in two following ways. Firstly, we 
adopt the dates of 3 July 2007 and 15 May 2009 for the beginning and end of the crisis episode based 
on findings in Dungey et al. (2015); this results in a crisis period starting earlier and finishing later than 
our original one as adopted from Baur (2012). Secondly, we impose a shorter crisis period as in Tong 
and Wei (2011), ranging between 31 July 2007 and 31 December 2008. The results (not reported to 
conserve space) indicate that extending the crisis episode as in Dungey et al. (2015) changes little our 
main conclusions about occurrence and types of contagion: out of 25 countries investigated, the 
contagion result is different in only three cases (contagion not being detected), and in another three the 
exact type of market reaction to crisis is different (for example, no reaction rather than decoupling shift). 
In the vast majority of cases, however, a longer crisis definition yields identical results to our initial 
crisis period definition. Results for the Tong and Wei (2011) crisis definition are somewhat less similar, 
which should come as no surprise as those authors rather radically terminate the crisis episode by the 
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end of year 2008. More specifically, with that short crisis episode we find different results in six cases 
(either non-existing contagion detected or existing contagion not detected), and further seven cases 
disagree on the exact form (but not the existence) of contagion. These results indicate that it is important 
to employ a reasonable definition of the crisis episode under investigation, but also that our method is 
rather robust to small, reasonable variations in this definition. In addition, if one employed a more 
conservative significance level (for example, 1% rather than 5%), the differences in results for our 
various crisis definitions would be even less pronounced. 
 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we propose a new approach for testing for the existence of financial contagion, which 
relies on, and allows for, the identification of distinct forms of contagion. Our framework can be seen 
as a unifying approach for two branches of the literature. On the one hand, it draws upon and represents 
an improved implementation of the “shift contagion” concept proposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2001), 
as it accounts for pre-crisis trends in financial integration, making mis-diagnosis of contagion less likely 
than under an assumption of regime constant linkages. It also allows us to describe different patterns of 
markets’ reactions to an outbreak of a crisis, both cross-sectionally and over the duration of the crisis 
period. Hence, we are able to identify three mutually exclusive and exhaustive types of contagion: 
“shock”, “recoupling”, and “kink” contagion. On the other hand, our approach can be employed using 
easily obtainable stock price data and does not require identification and use of proxies for economic 
fundamentals or contagion channels, and it can be efficiently estimated even if the crisis episode is 
relatively short, as it utilises high frequency stock price data only. Hence, it offers a convenient 
alternative to explicit modelling of the relationship between financial linkages and economic 
fundamentals, as in, for example, Bekaert et al. (2005) and Bekaert et al. (2014). 
When employed to test for contagion during the 2007-9 crisis episode on stock markets of 25 
leading world economies, our model identifies many fewer instances of contagion than a popular 
alternative approach, which assumes subperiod-specific time-invariant world market exposures (e.g., 
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Baur, 2012, Fry-McKibbin et al., 2014, Kenourgios and Dimitriou, 2015, Dungey and Gajurel, 2014, 
Dungey and Gajurel, 2015, Dungey et al., 2015). Hence, financial crises might not be as contagious as 
commonly believed, in line with previous findings by Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Brière et al. (2012), 
Beirne and Gieck (2014), etc. More importantly, we unveil the heterogeneity of markets’ reactions to 
world market shocks, with some suffering from contagion in the early phases whereas others in the late 
phases of the crisis, with initial contagion being permanent or transitory, with the pace of globalisation 
during crisis being affected positively, or negatively, or not at all, etc. Our findings of contagion being 
confined into specific phases of the crisis period correspond well with, for example, Dungey and Gajurel 
(2014), Kenourgios and Dimitriou (2015) and Dungey et al. (2015), but in our approach these phases 
emerge endogenously from model estimation. The most common contagion type identified here is shock 
contagion. This type of market reaction at crisis’ onset corresponds to the “wake up call” hypothesis of 
contagion by Goldstein (1998)but could also be generated by irrational changes in investors’ sentiment, 
especially when combined with their herding behaviour. 
For portfolio investors, it is important to know whether the linkages between asset markets are 
time-varying, and how these potentially abrupt changes could be predicted or their impact minimized, 
in order to devise safer investment strategies to benefit their clients. For instance, in presence of kink 
contagion the change in comovements between markets is minimal initially and gives investors the time 
to rebalance their portfolios, whereas shock contagion changes these comovements abruptly and 
investors should rather try to predict/hedge against it ex ante. Moreover, time-varying co-movements 
have significant impact on international portfolio diversification. The conventional wisdom is that 
benefits from diversification have been diminishing over time, due to progressing globalisation, and are 
especially weak in crises, as correlations between stock returns tend to be higher in bear markets. 
However, our finding of contagion being less prevalent than expected strengthens the rationale for 
international diversification even in crises, as demonstrated empirically by, for example, Vermeulen 
(2013). Policy makers aiming at stabilising domestic financial markets during crises would also benefit 
from the knowledge of whether the increased transmission of shocks originating abroad is due to 
fundamental causes or to contagion, and that contagion may materialise in one of several different 
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forms, in different phases of the crisis. Kink and recoupling contagion would give the policy makers 
time to assess their options, whereas shock contagion, which affects the country immediately, would 
necessitate instantaneous policy responses. As Forbes (2012) argues, policy options do differ in short- 
and long-run when it comes to dealing with contagion. 
Further research could explore how allowing for non-linearities in the market integration process 
could help to increase the precision of the contagion type identification method proposed here. In 
addition, it would be an interesting avenue to explore the determinants of the cross-country 
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Figure 1: Coefficients of the Globalisation Model (2) 
 
 


























































Contagion Example A 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Country Mean Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
 Pre-Crisis Crisis Post Crisis Pre-Crisis Crisis Post Crisis Pre-Crisis Crisis Post Crisis Pre-Crisis Crisis Post Crisis 
Australia 0.00191 -0.00652 0.00123 0.02549 0.04015 0.02394 -2.10724 -0.38642 -0.21755 30.9189 4.71685 4.63141 
Brazil 0.00360 -0.00384 0.00227 0.03846 0.04915 0.02613 -0.27925 -0.21771 -0.25701 6.44343 6.12240 4.43692 
Canada 0.00177 -0.00521 0.00218 0.02078 0.38382 0.02166 -1.25210 -0.87762 -0.20278 16.3499 6.49096 3.28318 
Chile 0.00355 -0.00286 0.00312 0.02636 0.03105 0.02092 0.13894 -0.59838 -0.62672 4.65206 4.75396 4.79918 
China 0.00239 -0.00491 0.00201 0.04989 0.07490 0.04115 -0.19460 -0.49372 -0.29615 7.94312 3.53570 5.26636 
France 0.00201 -0.00847 0.00171 0.02663 0.03855 0.03034 -0.85868 0.53744 -0.36013 8.17328 5.82418 3.86073 
Germany 0.00153 -0.00758 0.00255 0.02485 0.03496 0.03011 -1.01138 -0.44368 -0.72969 8.70641 3.87844 4.88579 
Hong Kong 0.00245 -0.00706 0.00306 0.03999 0.05397 0.03314 -1.24124 -0.23712 -0.14693 12.8475 3.43370 6.22510 
Indonesia 0.00125 -0.00569 0.00635 0.04217 0.06573 0.03090 0.14661 -0.62547 -0.70142 7.38568 7.58736 6.05421 
India 0.00324 -0.00555 0.00337 0.04410 0.06464 0.03138 -0.34061 -0.76598 0.78500 13.2442 4.40349 6.50855 
Italy 0.00238 -0.01062 0.00066 0.03290 0.04269 0.03469 -0.36876 0.93212 -0.28174 7.04928 8.80447 3.46451 
Japan 0.00104 -0.00876 0.00052 0.02564 0.04595 0.03018 -0.32883 -0.29314 -1.61279 6.41827 6.03788 15.8027 
Mexico 0.00538 -0.00472 0.00443 0.03849 0.03799 0.02009 0.80986 -0.30664 0.06447 11.2984 5.46240 3.98993 
New Zealand 0.00112 -0.00596 0.00067 0.02415 0.02318 0.01325 0.25477 -0.38919 -0.42660 11.1097 3.84211 7.39565 
Norway 0.00217 -0.00864 0.00292 0.03328 0.05844 0.03561 -1.12240 0.25264 -0.66167 14.4147 6.34500 4.41639 
Russia 0.00719 -0.00790 0.00356 0.06610 0.07898 0.04269 -0.27926 -0.48961 -0.49900 10.0495 7.58611 5.46151 
South Africa 0.00323 -0.00364 0.00293 0.03139 0.04286 0.02281 -0.85337 -0.18334 -0.52971 8.57973 4.84190 3.79301 
South Korea 0.00153 -0.00508 0.00344 0.04343 0.04753 0.02914 0.13487 -0.19350 -1.17768 4.90338 4.08660 8.67198 
Spain 0.00179 -0.00821 0.00008 0.02668 0.04092 0.03347 -0.85658 0.18293 0.08794 7.44859 9.04347 3.50523 
Sweden 0.00262 -0.00836 0.00355 0.03196 0.04767 0.03071 -0.50988 0.80649 -0.20240 6.13398 7.05835 3.59010 
Switzerland 0.00183 -0.00703 0.00161 0.02165 0.03498 0.02238 -1.47246 0.45919 -0.87236 13.7148 5.48303 6.25258 
Taiwan 0.00104 -0.00663 0.00235 0.04709 0.04681 0.02926 -0.41153 0.04231 -0.05440 5.22967 3.07305 8.00898 
Thailand 0.00192 -0.00803 0.00658 0.04581 0.04748 0.03238 0.16577 -0.24338 -0.43014 7.36816 5.89286 4.58888 
UK 0.00187 -0.00615 0.00276 0.02150 0.03855 0.02735 -1.53066 0.77247 -0.46278 17.8027 6.43824 4.74983 
US 0.00193 -0.00705 0.00362 0.02236 0.03843 0.02517 -1.37652 -0.95022 -0.33767 19.3951 6.13009 3.46606 
 
Note: Descriptive statistics of weekly aggregate stock market returns for each of the 25 countries in the sample for the pre-crisis (Oct 1979 – Jul 2007), crisis (Aug 2007 –Mar 






Table 2: Estimation Results for Model (2) 
Country    Pre-Crisis Crisis Post Crisis Result 
 ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐 ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏  
Australia 0.0012*** -0.0016 -0.0024** 0.7489*** -0.0002*** 9.4904*** -0.0060 *** 0.3016*** - Contagion 
Brazil 0.0031*** 0.0018 -0.0037** 1.0132*** - -0.0176 - -0.2115*** - No Contagion 
Canada 0.0007* 0.0004 -0.0007 0.7119 *** - 0.0604 - -0.0527 - No Contagion 
Chile 0.0021*** -0.0009 0.0009 -0.0387 0.0003*** 15.1696 *** -0.0100 *** -0.1050 - Contagion 
China 0.0010* 0.0044 -0.0028 0.6956*** - 28.5010*** -0.0184*** 0.4394*** - Contagion 
France 0.0008 -0.0037** -0.0025** 0.4475*** 0.0004 *** -0.1464** - -0.0022 - No Contagion 
Germany 0.0007 -0.0019 -0.0014 0.2617*** 0.0006*** -0.3233 *** - -3.6438** 0.0021** No Contagion 
Hong Kong 0.0022*** -0.0013 -0.0022 0.6019*** 0.0002** 20.2149*** -0.0132*** -0.0011 - Contagion 
Indonesia 0.0016 0.0040 0.0029 -0.3847** 0.0009*** 19.51*** -0.0129*** -0.4890*** - Contagion 
India 0.0035*** 0.0023 -0.0031 -0.7744*** 0.0011*** 17.8411*** -0.0118*** 5.6710* -0.0038** Contagion 
Italy 0.0004 -0.0044*** -0.0034** 0.2928*** 0.0004*** -5.4261* 0.0036* 0.1759** - Contagion 
Japan -0.0003 -0.0012 0.00001 0.6580*** 0.0003*** 16.41*** -0.0110 *** -0.5609 *** - Contagion 
Mexico 0.0033*** -0.0022 -0.0016 0.4680*** 0.0003** -0.1347** - 5.831*** -0.0039*** Contagion 
New Zealand 0.0012*** -0.0046*** -0.0015 0.3271*** - 0.0728* - -0.0678* - Contagion 
Norway 0.0017*** -0.0010 -0.0022 0.4195*** 0.0003** 0.3194*** - 0.2546*** - Contagion 
Russia 0.0048*** -0.0031 -0.0042* 1.020*** - 0.0637 - 9.024*** - 0.0055*** No Contagion 
South Africa 0.0027*** 0.0007 -0.0010 0.2894*** 0.0003*** 0.1180 - -0.1565 *** - No Contagion 
South Korea 0.0002 0.0003 0.0011 -0.2701 0.0010*** 11.33 ** -0.0078 ** -0.6987 *** - No Contagion 
Spain 0.0009* -0.0044 ** -0.0035** 0.4121 *** 0.0003*** -0.0862 - -0.0169 - No Contagion 
Sweden 0.0015** -0.0049** -0.0014 0.2512*** 0.0006*** -0.2956*** - -0.3612*** - No Contagion 
Switzerland 0.0014*** -0.0039** -0.0016 0.2247*** 0.0004 *** -0.0556 - -0.2398*** - No Contagion 
Taiwan -0.0001 -0.0009 0.0006 0.2185 0.0005*** 12.7843*** -0.0086 *** -0.3326*** - Contagion 
Thailand 0.0016 -0.0032 0.0030 0.6341 *** - 0.1914** - 0.0937 - Contagion 
UK 0.0006 -0.0013 -0.0007 0.5232*** 0.0002*** 0.09323* - 0.1417** - Contagion 
US -0.00004 0.0003 0.0012 0.9435 *** - -5.7349*** 0.0038*** -0.0856 ** - No Contagion 
Note: Parameters stem from model (2): 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + +𝛽1𝑡𝑅𝑊,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑅𝑤,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝛽3𝑡𝑅𝑊,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, where  𝛽1𝑡 =  𝛿0 +
𝛿1𝑡,    𝛽2𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑡,  𝛽3𝑡 =  𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑡, where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 denotes stock returns in country i at time t, 𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 (𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆) is a dummy variable equal to one during the crisis 
(post-crisis) period and zero otherwise, and  𝑅𝑊,𝑡 is the return of the world stock index. Error terms are modelled as a GJR-GARCH (1,1) process, corrected for autocorrelation 
in residuals where required. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Insignificant trend terms (𝛿1, 𝛾1, 𝜃1) are excluded and model (2) is re-





Table 3: Types of Contagion 






 ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕 =  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕 =  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 t- statistic 
Australia 9.4904*** -0.0060 *** 0.7189 7.7736 0.2051 2.2871 Shock Contagion (Permanent) C C 
Brazil -0.0176 - -0.0176 - -0.0176 - No Contagion   
Canada 0.0604 - 0.0604 - 0.0604 - No Contagion C C 
Chile 15.1696 *** -0.0100 *** 0.6314 4.0146 -0.2202 -1.9948 Shock Contagion (Reversal) C C 
China 28.5010*** -0.0184*** 1.7630 6.4243 0.1967 1.0422 Shock Contagion (Transitory) C C 
France -0.1464** - -0.1464 - -0.1464 - No Contagion (Decoupling Shift) C C 
Germany -0.3233 *** - -0.3233 - -0.3233 - No Contagion (Decoupling Shift)   
Hong Kong 20.2149*** -0.0132*** 0.9877 5.5096 -0.1386 -1.0507 Shock Contagion (Transitory) C C 
Indonesia 19.51*** -0.0129*** 0.6824 3.0203 -0.4202 -2.4878 Shock Contagion (Reversal) C C 
India 17.8411*** -0.0118*** 0.7513 3.1990 -0.2497 -1.3916 Shock Contagion (Transitory) C C 
Italy -5.4261* 0.0036* -0.1770 -1.7627 0.1305 1.6313 Recoupling Contagion C C 
Japan 16.41*** -0.0110 *** 0.3983 2.8124 -0.5399 -5.6790 Shock Contagion (Reversal) C  
Mexico -0.1347** - -0.1347 - -0.1347 - No Contagion (Decoupling Shift) C  
New Zealand 0.0728* - 0.0728 - 0.0728 - Shock Contagion (Level Shift) C C 
Norway 0.3194*** - 0.3194 - 0.3194 - Shock Contagion (Level Shift) C C 
Russia 0.0637 - 0.0637 - 0.0637 - No Contagion    
South Africa 0.1180 - 0.1180 - 0.1180 - No Contagion C C 
South Korea 11.33 ** -0.0078 ** 0.0582 0.3192 -0.6028 -3.7450 No Contagion (Decoupling) C C 
Spain -0.0862 - -0.0862 - -0.0862 - No Contagion   
Sweden -0.2956*** - -0.2956 - -0.2956 - No Contagion (Decoupling Shift)   
Switzerland -0.0556 - -0.0556 - -0.0556 - No Contagion C C 
Taiwan 12.7843*** -0.0086 *** 0.3714 1.8488 -0.3557 -2.2609 Shock Contagion (Reversal)   
Thailand 0.1914** - 0.1914 - 0.1914 - Shock Contagion (Level Shift) C C 
UK 0.0932* - 0.0932 - 0.0932 - Shock Contagion (Level Shift) C C 
US -5.7349*** 0.0038*** -0.2733 -3.5387 0.0466 1.0092 No Contagion (Decoupling)   
Note: Parameters stem from model (2): 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + +𝛽1𝑡𝑅𝑊,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑅𝑤,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝛽3𝑡𝑅𝑊,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, where  𝛽1𝑡 =  𝛿0 +
𝛿1𝑡,    𝛽2𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑡,  𝛽3𝑡 =  𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑡, where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 denotes stock returns in country i at time t, 𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 (𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆) is a dummy variable equal to one during the crisis 
(post-crisis) period and zero otherwise, and  𝑅𝑊,𝑡 is the return of the world stock index. Model (1) is:  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑊,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑤,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 .  Model (1’) is 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 +
𝛼1𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + +𝛽1𝑅𝑊,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑤,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑊,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 where it should be noted  𝛽1, 𝛽2, and 𝛽3 are time invariant. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  Insignificant trend terms (𝛿1, 𝛾1, 𝜃1) are excluded and model (2) is re-estimated where relevant. Error terms are modelled 
as a GJR-GARCH (1,1) process, corrected for autocorrelation in residuals where required. The hypotheses for shock contagion are: 𝐻0: 𝛽2(𝜏1) ≤ 0,   𝐻1: 𝛽2(𝜏1) > 0  , for 
recoupling contagion: 𝐻0: 𝛽2(𝜏1) ≥ 0,   𝐻1: 𝛽2(𝜏1) < 0 and  𝐻0: 𝛽2(𝜏2) ≤ 0,   𝐻1: 𝛽2(𝜏2) > 0, and for kink contagion: 𝐻0: 𝛽2(𝜏1) = 0,  𝐻1: 𝛽2(𝜏1) ≠ 0  and  𝐻0: 𝛾1 ≤ 0, 
𝐻𝐴: 𝛾1 > 0. A ‘C’ in the final two columns indicates contagion.  
